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Subsidizing Religious Participation through Groups:  
A Model of the “Megachurch” Strategy for Growth 
 
I.  Introduction 
 The phenomenon known as “megachurches” (defined as Protestant churches 
having at least 2000 attendees per week) has garnered significant attention both in the 
popular media [see Cooper (2009), Shah (2008), and Woodfill (2009), for example] and 
among academics [Thumma (1996), Thumma, Travis, and Bird (2005)].   Studies of 
megachurches suggest that the churches are significantly different from more established, 
traditional, denominational churches in some important ways [see Thumma (1996), 
Thumma and Travis (2007) and Kaczorowski (1997) for detailed analysis].  Some 
megachurches deliberately work to attract new attendees by requiring little or no early 
involvement or commitment from them; there is no pressure to participate, contribute 
money, or volunteer time.  Many megachurches take the appearance more of a mall or 
college campus than a traditional church.  They are large, open in architecture, and often 
do not display crosses or other religious symbols even though they are rooted in 
Christianity.  Last, group activities focused on both secular and religious activities often 
play an important role. 
 Though some conservative churches that maintain strict requirements for 
membership (e.g., Southern Baptists) are growing, many moderate or liberal churches are 
experiencing declining memberships.  Finke and Stark (1992) and Iannaccone (1992, 
1994) suggest religions that require personal sacrifice and are rooted in doctrinal content 
will flourish while those that do not will atrophy.  Despite their non-traditional approach, 
however, megachurches have had large and significant growth in the U.S. since 1980.  
Thumma, Travis, and Bird (2005) document their success between 2000 and 2005, noting 
that megachurches have done very well in not only recruiting new members but also 
retaining them.  The success of megachurches in this light is therefore worthy of study.   
 The growth and apparent success of megachurches raises many interesting 
questions that must be answered to better understand their success.  Among these 
questions are first, how can a megachurch encourage increased participation, and second, 
whether they succeed in increasing a member’s religious capital?  This paper first 
summarizes some of the key literature on megachurches and important characteristics 
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that may explain their success in attracting and retaining members. We then focus in 
particular on the use of small groups, often centered on secular activities, as a means for 
subsidizing the individual’s participation at the megachurch thereby increasing the 
individual’s investment into their religious capital associated with the megachurch.  To 
facilitate our analysis, we employ a model of utility maximization allowing for both 
private and spillover benefits from participating in religious activities. With spillovers, 
the individual’s optimal level of participation is below that which the church finds 
optimal. This provides a motivation for the church to subsidize participation. Providing 
small groups activities that package a religious participation (which could be prayer 
before and after the activity or even networking within the religious group) within a 
secular activity (say an exercise group) is but one means of subsidizing participation.  
Hence, the model explains megachurches’ success (at least in part) as a function of its 
willingness to subsidize members’ participation in religious activities through the use of 
groups which in turn increase members’ religious investment.    Finally, the paper 
examines survey data from Faith Communities Today 2000 (FACT2000) comparing 
megachurches and non-megachurches which provide support for these conclusions. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an 
overview of trends in the U.S. religious market as well as a general overview of the 
characteristics of megachurches.  Section III presents our model to illustrate how 
megachurches might subsidize participation so as to successfully compete in the current 
religious market.  Section IV examines the results of the FACT2000 survey and provides 
data on the use of group activities, the emotional attachment of participants, and the 
expected level of commitment. Section V provides a conclusion. 
 
II. Megachurches and Religious Trends in the U.S.  
 Thumma and Travis (2007) estimate that there are 1,250 megachurches in a 
market of 335,000 congregations, and that approximately 100 new megachurches are 
established each year.  Though megachurches themselves are not a new phenomenon, 
their recent and rapid growth is.   The seeker-oriented megachurch (such as Saddelback 
in California and Willow Creek in Illinois) is often the one that comes to mind when 
megachurches are discussed.  They have grown rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, and are 
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focused on evangelizing those who may seek God.   They attempt to appeal to those 
individuals previously turned off by organized religion, trying to connect with people 
who have abandoned or have remained outside of a traditional faith.  They downplay 
denominational affiliation and traditional religious services.  Instead, they rely on a 
modern look (e.g., a mall or college campus), have music driven by drums and electric 
guitars, and frequently employ media during a service.   In order to better understand 
their success, we explore recent trends in the U.S. market for religious affiliation and 
characterize key features of megachurches as they grow in this market. 
Market Characteristics 
 Churches active in the market for followers will not only compete with one 
another to gain members, but also with secular activities.  Iannaccone (1992, 1994) 
makes the case that strict churches are most likely to experience growth while more 
liberal denominations will decline.  He argues that participating in a religion is like a club 
good in that the utility an individual derives from participating is a function of, among 
other things, the degree others also participate.  The public good aspect, however, of such 
an activity can engender free-riding.  To minimize such behavior, a strict church employs 
strategies to only attract committed members and thereby minimize the free-riding 
problem.  Consequently, strict churches will be successful while lax churches will 
atrophy.  
 Kosmin and Keysar (2006) study religious trends in the U.S. based on data 
gathered through their American Religious Identification Survey, conducted in 2001.  
They note that Americans are increasingly comfortable employing their rights as 
consumers of religion to switch between religions.  In fact, they found that 33 million 
Americans (16% of the adult U.S. population) had changed their religious affiliation.  
Their study finds a polarization with regard to the winners and losers in the market for 
religion.  On one end of the spectrum, groups demanding significant commitment are 
growing while on the other end of the spectrum many people are switching to “No 
Religion”, thereby leaving religion altogether.  While both extremes are finding favor 
with U.S. adults, most low-commitment religions, or the middle, are not faring so well.  
These trends support the predictions of Iannaccone’s (1992, 1994) theory of the success 
of strict churches.  He categorizes the more mainline or liberal denominations as least 
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distinctive or strict, which include Presbyterian, United Churches of Christ, and 
Methodist, whereas more distinctive or strict denominations include Born Again 
Fundamentalist, Pentacostal, and sects, such as Jehovah’s Witness and Seventh Day 
Adventist.  Table 1 illustrates Kosmin and Keysar’s findings across religious groups and 
shows that the relatively strict denominations are among the growing while the least 
distinctive are in decline.   
 
Table 1: Gains and Losses by Religious Group 
 
Religious Group Iannacone
1 
(1994) 
Campbell2 
(2000) 
Smith3  
(1990) 
Change 
(%) 
Evangelical/Born 
Again  S F 42 
Non-Denominational   M 37 
No Religion    23 
Pentacostal  S F 16 
Buddhist    12 
Christian  S  11 
Jehovah's Witness F  F 11 
Seventh Day Adventist F S F 11 
Muslim   F 8 
Assemblies of God F S F 7 
Episcopalian/Anglican L M M 5 
Church of God  S F 5 
Mormon F  F 0 
Baptist M/C S F -1 
Lutheran M/C S/M M -1 
Presbyterian L M M -2 
Churches of Christ L S F -2 
Jewish   L -4 
Congregational/UCC L  M -6 
Methodist L M M -7 
Catholic M  M -9 
Protestant       -14 
1. F  ≡ fundamentalist, Pentecostal and sects, C ≡ conservative and evangelical, M ≡ moderate mainline, L 
≡ liberal mainline. 
2. S ≡ strict denominations, M ≡ mainline Protestant 
3. F ≡ fundamentalist, M ≡ moderate, L ≡ liberal. 
Sources:  Iannaccone (1994), Campbell (2000), Smith (1990), and Kosmin and Keysar (2006)  
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In the same study, Kosmin and Keysar note that there is a significant group of adults that 
identify with a church but do not affiliate.  They find that 81 percent of American adults 
identify with a religious group, but just over one-half live in households where somebody 
is currently a member of a church.  Further, of those that claim an affiliation, 30 percent 
have no tie to a congregation.  With regard to a religious market, these findings suggest 
that many of the national population are “religious refugees”, either affiliating with no 
religion or having weak ties to a church.  Based on their previous affiliation, they have at 
least some form of religious capital (as in Iannaccone, 1990) and may serve as promising 
recruits to a church seeking to grow in numbers.    
 The distribution of those who characterize their religiosity across different age 
groups further shows that churches are more likely to have access to these religious 
refugees within younger age groups.  Figure 1 summarizes self reported religiosity across 
age groups. 
Figure 1: Religiosity Across Age Groups 
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Source: Kosmin and Keysar (2006) 
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Examining Figure 1, we see that there is a larger market for somewhat secular and secular 
individuals among 18-35 and 35-49 year olds.  Karnes, et. al (2007) examine the spatial 
growth of megachurches and note that they not only target these age groups, but that 
these groups are associated with relatively high income earnings, impacting 
megachurches’ ability to finance growth. 
The religious marketplace has also changed in that churches previously were 
chosen first by their doctrine, and then by name and denomination.  According to 
Kraczorowski (1997), churches are now primarily chosen by function and form.  
Strategies for church growth that succeeded when doctrine trumped function and form 
may be outdated as churches increasingly reach out to religious refugees in order to grow.   
Among these strategies, churches may invoke more secular culture into their religious 
message in order to attract new followers from the pool of religious refugees.  It may be 
argued that churches are considering “pull” rather then “push” strategies.  In other words, 
given increased secularization and willingness of individuals to part with the religious 
upbringing, churches need to compete in a market for followers, and they do so by 
“pulling” people in via efforts to personalize the spiritual quest rather than “push” via 
unquestioning adherence to dogma.  To this end, Kaczorowski observes that the new 
church is not a dictator, but rather is a servant of the people.   
 Miller (2002) considers competitive strategies of growth-oriented religious 
organizations that impact our examination of megachurches.  Despite Iannaccone’s 
strictness theory and the empirical support in favor of it, Miller raises two issues that 
directly impact the focus of this paper.  First, though strictness represents but one strategy 
to overcome the free riding problem, we still need to understand why “different religious 
organizations differ in their ability to extract commitments from individuals” (p.440).  
Second,  Miller (p. 445) notes that the strictness theory “may conflict with the dynamic 
goal of increasing total organizational resources through growth in the number of 
participants.”   He adds that accommodating distinct preferences can engender high 
commitment.   With this in mind, we next consider characteristics of megachurches 
before introducing a model to illustrate megachurches’ strategy. 
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The Megachurch Business Model  
 Given the increased trend of religious switching, Thumma (1996) suggests that 
this is a particularly fertile period for seeker-oriented megachurches.  The megachurch 
has an opportunity to employ a new strategy to expand its organization, specifically 
targeting the growing group of religious refugees.   
In order to successfully draw in religious refugees, megachurches deliberately 
present themselves as distinct from traditional churches, signaling their new approach to 
a religious life.  For example, they have a modern look and downplay the display of 
religious symbols.   They accept new attendees without pressure to participate, contribute 
money, or volunteer time.  They provide group activities, many of which are anchored in 
secular activities, in an effort to help assimilate new members and deepen their affiliation 
with the church.   
These unconventional techniques are no accident.  They are the result of, in many 
cases, polling people to better understand what potential and actual members want and 
accommodating those needs in church programming (Thumma and Travis, 2007).  Since 
the megachurch’s strategy to grow is based on reaching out to religious refugees, it 
maintains a deliberate flexibility to respond to the perceived needs of potential members.   
Thumma (1996) likewise notes that this approach can be seen not only in their 
institutional practices but also in their physical structures: both are designed to be 
flexible, anticipating adjustments that will allow for future growth.  If we add to this the 
aforementioned minimal emphasis on denominational affiliation, megachurches can 
accommodate growth and change rather than resist it because of either physical or 
doctrinal constraints.  
 One important manifestation of their flexibility is the use of groups based in many 
popular secular interests (for example, a fitness group or sports team) as a way to engage 
new attendees.  The idea being that, as new attendees participate in these church-
sponsored activities, they add to their religious capital.   
Operationally, the megachurch provides “seeker” services which allow new(er) 
attendees, often religious refugees, to visit the church’s religious services without the 
expectation of participation.  Over time newer members are invited to smaller group 
meetings, organized by themes that allow interaction with more devout members.  These 
 8 
groups are often based on secular interests, but offered through the church.  The strategy 
also acts as a subsidy to individuals’ participation by lowering the full cost of 
participation since the activity is based on something they would likely do outside of 
church.  These groups become the conduit by which new attendees increasingly 
participate, thereby investing in their religious capital and deepening their association 
with the church.   Later, there are “believer” services in which greater participation is 
expected.  This process is clearly a different approach than that taken by traditional 
churches seeking to minimize free riding by requiring significant commitments by 
members throughout their association with the church.     
Naturally, the strategy involves risk.  It may be the case that new attendees do free 
ride, enjoying the services without becoming participatory members.  Were this 
predominantly the case, the megachurch would not grow.  The evidence, at least at first 
glance, suggests that the megachurch strategy is successful.  Thumma, Travis, and Bird 
(2005) document trends of megachurch growth between 2000 and 2005 and find that the 
number of megachurches has nearly doubled in the last five years.  Moreover, attendance 
at megachurches has grown while national trends in denominational affiliation have 
fallen.  Consequently, megachurches are among the most successful churches today in 
attracting and retaining members, suggesting that they foster on-going commitment in 
their members [Thumma, Travis, and Bird (2005)].  
  
III. Religious Consumption and Investment  
 Given the above discussion, we view a megachurch as a unique religious 
organization whose strategy is to capitalize on the increasingly competitive market for 
followers in a time of empowered religious consumers.  Megachurches deliberately work 
to attract religious refugees allowing for the low-cost transfer of existing religious capital 
to the megachurch, and offer ways to encourage additional religious investment through 
their numerous group-based activities related to various religious and secular interests.  
These characteristics of megachurches provide our basis for examining their strategy and 
success.  In particular, do megachurches experience increased commitment among their 
members by way of subsidizing their participation through the use of various group based 
activities?  
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A Simple Model of Optimal Religious Consumption   
 We begin with the utility of the individual and focus on both the private the non-
private aspects of participating in religious activities, following Cornes and Sandler’s 
(1996) model of an imperfect public good. In this model, individual j can consume two 
goods, a purely private and secular good, y, and the religious good, q. Purchases of good 
y at price Py are converted directly into a private consumption good. The individual’s 
“purchases” of q represent the individual’s expenditure of their resource endowment in 
order to consume the religious good. This expenditure of resources takes the form of 
participation, tithing, prayer, volunteering, reading the bible, networking with other 
church members and so on. When an individual commits to a unit of q, they produce two 
goods; a purely private religious good, xj, and a non-private religious good z, which 
benefits both the individual as well as other members of the church. Hence, zj, has an 
externality which is assumed here to be positive. The individual also benefits from the 
investment of other church members through this positive externality. To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that this effect is additive across all J individuals and denoted as z~  j, 
where 
 
1.  
,
J
j i
i i j
z z
≠
= ∑  
 
Individuals may also possess a stock of existing religious capital, q0j, acquired prior to the 
entry into the new church (thus, q0j represents the individual’s stock of religious capital 
that existed at the end of the previous period).  The portability of existing religious capital 
may play an important role in switching and the growth of megachurches, but this aspect 
is beyond the scope of this paper and so it plays a secondary role in the current analysis. 
Based on these assumptions, we model the utility function of the individual as: 
 
2.  ( , , )j j j j jU U y x z z= +   
where 
3.  0( )
j j jx q qα λ= +  
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4.  0( )
j j jz q qβ λ= +  
5.  0
, ,
( )
jJ
j i i i
i i j i i j
z z q qβ λ
≠ ≠
= = +∑ ∑  
 
The parameters α and β capture the rates that the existing stock of religious capital and 
new investment are transformed into the private and non-private religious goods, 
respectively. The parameter λ captures the portability of religious capital acquired at 
another institution or outside of the new church.  In other words it reflects the quality or 
match of the existing religious capital to the new church. This parameter need not be the 
same across goods or individuals as is assumed here for simplicity. Note that the 
individual is not only concerned with the match of their existing religious capital with the 
new church, but also with the quality or match of other individuals’ religious capital.  
Hence, the individual might want a certain “type” of individual to join the church.  Again, 
these considerations are beyond the scope of this paper but present a possibly interesting 
avenue of additional research. 
The individual faces a resource constraint given by: 
 
6.  0( )
j j j
yP y C q q I+ =  
 
Where Py is the price of good y, C(qoj), represents the cost of participation in the religious 
activity, with C’(qoj)<0 and C’’(qoj)>0.  Hence, as the stock of religious capital increases, 
it reduces the marginal cost of the next unit of religious participation, but with 
diminishing returns.  We can see that the larger λ is, the more that past religious capital is 
maintained at the megachurch.  Ij is the combination of money income and available time 
of the individual.  For simplicity, we can refer to the right hand side of (6) as the resource 
endowment the individual has to apply towards the purchase of the secular good and 
participation in the religious activity.  A separate time constraint could also be considered 
here but does not affect our general conclusions and so is omitted to keep the model 
straightforward. 
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The utility maximizing individual would invest into q^    j units of the religious product 
up to the point where the marginal benefit (utility) is equal to the marginal cost. This 
solution is denoted as:1
 
 
7.  ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ), ( ) 0j j j jq qU C q orU C q′ ′= − =  
 
From the church’s perspective, the value of the individual’s investment of q^    j should 
reflect the total of the value of the marginal utility of the individual, which includes both 
the private benefit and the spillover benefit that other church members receive from the 
individual’s investment. We denote this spillover as 0jiqV > .  By definition this spillover 
is not internalized when the individual decides on the optimal level of participation.   
From the church’s perspective, the optimal level of investment of individual j, q~   j, is 
therefore: 
 
8.  ˆ ˆ( ) 0j
j i j
q q
U V C q′+ − =  
 
Thus, the church would desire a higher level of religious participation and investment 
than would the individual due to the external benefit of an individual’s participation.   
 
Subsidizing Participation 
The church could induce a higher level of participation by lowering the relative 
cost. This can be done by either lowering the cost, or subsidization, of q or increasing the 
cost of y. The latter could be accomplished by “penalizing” the individual for the 
consumption of the secular good y, and is consistent with a strategy of “strictness” to 
minimizing free riding.  However, subsidizing participation and investment would 
represent a more realistic strategy to attract religious refugees.   Hence, we shift the focus 
from increasing the price of the secular good to the church reducing the cost by 
subsidizing additional participation.  
                                                          
1 For a complete solution of a model of impure public goods and the related comparative statics, the reader 
is referred to Cornes and Sandler (1996) pp. 290 through 299. 
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As mentioned in Section II, megachurches encourage participation by employing 
what otherwise would be a secular activity as the theme for a church-based group.  Thus, 
in the context of our model, they accomplish two important outcomes.  First, they lower 
the cost of participation by housing a religious activity in what would otherwise be a non-
religious activity (e.g., a running group organized by members of a church that enjoy 
exercise).  This serves as an immediate and direct way to increase participation.   
Second, by accepting participation in a secular activity and bundling it within 
overall religious participation, as opposed to viewing secular activities as competing 
activities, they create a complementary relationship between secular interests and church 
group activities.  The impact this has on the individual’s private benefit and consequently 
her optimal decision making  can be illustrated in our model as follows.  To focus 
attention on this outcome, we simplify the analysis and omit the spillover effects 
mentioned previously by assuming that zj and z both equal zero.      
We define the individual’s utility as a function of the consumption of the secular 
good and the religious good: 
 
9.  ( , )j j jU U y q= , 
 
with utility maximized subject to the constraint given in equation 6.  This constrained 
maximization allows us to calculate comparative statics with regard to the exogenous 
variables.   Of interest to us is the response of the optimal investment in the religious 
good to a change in the endowment of resources, 
 
10.  
*
0( ( ) ) ( )
j
yy y qyC q u P uq
I H
− +∂
=
∂
 
 
We note that uyy is the second-order partial derivative of utility with respect to the private  
good (y) and is negative by assumption.  Similarly, uqy is the cross partial derivative of  
utility with respect to the religious and secular good.  Its sign is either positive or 
negative, depending on the complementarity or substitutability of the private and 
religious good.  Since, as mentioned above, many of the group activities provided by the 
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megachurches are housed in a secular activity we maintain that the megachurch has made 
the two goods complements in consumption (in contrast to many traditional churches 
which view them as substitutes).  Finally, the denominator is positive by the second order 
condition.  As a result, the comparative static carries a positive sign.  This is important 
for the megachurch in that, by making the religious and secular goods complements as 
opposed to substitutes as “strict” churches do, they create the opportunity for attendees to 
increase their participation as their resource endowment grows.    This outcome is 
compromised for churches that view religious and secular activities as substitutes.   
In the context of our model, this strategy has a secondary effect in so far as 
increased participation in the religious activity in this period results in a higher level of 
religious capital next period.  We assume that the cost of religious participation falls at a 
decreasing rate as the stock of religious capital existing in the previous period rises (i.e., 
C’(qoj)<0 and C’’(qoj)>0).  Consequently, the future cost of religious participation will 
fall as current participation and therefore the stock of religious capital rises, thereby 
encouraging additional religious participation in the future.  
 The emphasis on small groups united by a common interest (often, on its own a 
secular interest) is one way to accommodate distinct preferences and subsidizing a 
member’s investment in the church.   Thumma and Travis (2007) state that Americans 
want choices, and the act of choosing creates commitment.  The options provided by 
different groups at the megachurch allow members to interact with the church and its 
members on their own terms.  This allows members to increase their participation, 
commitment, and religious capital, through a process whereby the megachurch shares in 
or subsidizes the investment via interest-specific groups.  This then helps to reduce the 
cost of engaging in the religious activities for the member in the future.    
   
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 Our portrayal of a typical megachurch strategy lends itself to two specific testable 
hypotheses.  First, in an effort to subsidize participation, megachurches employ groups 
more than non-megachurches.  Second, if indeed megachurches employ groups more 
than non-megachurches, then individuals invest more in their religious capital when they 
are members of a megachurch than a non-megachurch. 
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 Given the fact that megachurches have only recently garnered significant attention 
among academics, empirical researchers have been hindered by a shortage of data.  
However, work was recently done to gather high quality data on megachurches through 
the Faith Communities Today 2000 (FACT2000) survey.  The data are available through 
the Association of Religion Data archives, www.TheArda.com, and were collected by 
David Roozen.2
Since the FACT2000 survey plays an important role in our analysis, we briefly 
describe the survey before we evaluate the empirical results.  The FACT2000 survey was 
the largest survey of congregations in the U.S.  It is also allows for the first systematic 
study of megachurches.  FACT(2000) allows researchers to investigate a variety of 
congregational characteristics including their growth patterns, programming efforts, and 
congregational life.  It measures 280 variables, and the responses represent 41 
denominations and faith groups (approximately 90% of all U.S. congregations and 
faiths).  Bird (2007) notes that the survey averaged over a 50% return rate, resulting in 
over 14,000 returned surveys.    
   
Our data analysis consists of comparing the responses of megachurches to non-
megachurches on a number of issues related to our hypotheses.  To conduct the analysis, 
we first separate megachurches from non-megachurches.  We apply the definition of 
megachurches being Protestant churches with weekly attendance of 2000 or more.  
FACT(2000) classifies denominations as belonging to one of the following categories: 
Liberal Protestant, Moderate Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Historic Black, Catholic 
and Orthodox, or other.  Our megachurch subset thus includes liberal, moderate, and 
evangelical Protestant congregations with 2000 or more attendees.  The non-megachurch 
sample includes Catholic and Orthodox, Historic Black churches, and “other”.3
                                                          
2 We are indebted to Warren Bird whose 2007 Ph.D. thesis made us aware of the data set and who also 
applied similar tests to some of these questions.  Our results support and extend his results. 
  Of these 
returns, the survey received 192 usable responses from megachurches and 14,109 usable 
responses form non-megachurches.   
3 While it may be argued that Historic Black churches may be treated as Protestant, and thus potentially be 
included in our megachurch sub-sample, we follow Coreno (2002) and Welch et al (2004), who argue for a 
separate classification for Black Protestant denominations because of the unique historical experience of 
black denominations. 
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Our first hypothesis states that megachurches employ groups more than non-
megachurches.  We conduct a difference of means test between megachurches and non-
megachurches offering a variety of different groups.  While it would be preferable to 
illustrate more details regarding the number of groups relative to the size of the church, 
the specific phrasing of the survey questions do not allow more detailed analysis than a 
difference of means test.  We examine groups engaged in the following activities: bible 
study, theological study, prayer/meditation, spiritual retreats, community service, 
parenting or marriage enrichment, choir, performing arts, book discussion, self-help, 
fitness activities, sports teams, youth groups, and young adult programs.  The survey 
responses are categorized into whether the church offers a group or multiple groups (but 
not how many) in that category or not.  Results showing the percent that do offer a given 
type of group are provided in Table 2, below. 
 
Table 2:  Megachurches Compared to Non-Megachurches for Groups 
Type of Group Megachurch Non-Megachurch p-value
Bible/Scripture study 58.00% 62.00% 0.040
Theological Study 86.00% 43.00% 0.000
Prayer/Meditation 93.00% 56.00% 0.000
Spiritual Retreats 89.00% 35.00% 0.000
Community Service 89.00% 66.00% 0.000
Parenting/Marriage Enrichment 88.00% 29.00% 0.000
Choir 90.00% 58.00% 0.000
Performing arts 90.00% 45.00% 0.000
Book Discussion 71.00% 30.00% 0.000
Self-help 88.00% 30.00% 0.000
Fitness Activities 77.00% 18.00% 0.000
Sports Teams 83.00% 26.00% 0.000
Youth Groups 91.00% 68.00% 0.000
Young Adult Activities 88.00% 35.00% 0.000  
 
The results indicate that, aside for Bible/Scripture study groups, megachurches do 
employ groups more than non-megachurches.  In all cases, the difference is statistically 
significant and in many cases, the absolute difference is also rather striking.  With regard 
to the Bible/Scripture study groups, we see only a four percent difference.  This result 
may be explained by the fact that, as noted earlier, megachurches employ groups more 
related to secular activities to bring seekers to the church.  Thus, the significantly larger 
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number of groups focused on (for example) parenting and marriage enrichment, fitness, 
and sports activities substitute in part for a more traditional church group.  
In fact, the results illustrate the greatest disparity between megachurches and non-
megachurches are those groups related to secular activities.  The top four largest 
differentials (Parenting/Marriage Enrichment, Fitness, Self Help, and Sports Teams, all 
showing nearly a 60% difference) are all related to non-directly religious activities.  
Further, aside from Bible/Scripture study, the proportion of megachurches that offer both 
religious- and secular-based groups is much larger than the proportion of non-
megachurches that do.   
 Our next hypothesis states that individuals attending a megachurch, in response to 
these groups, participate more in church group activities and as a result invest more 
heavily in their religious capital than a members of a non-megachurch.  We may 
approach this hypothesis from three perspectives.  First, borrowing from the results just 
discussed, groups would not be offered by a church if individuals did not participate.   
Thus, the results provided in Table 2 illustrate the extent to which megachurches employ 
groups to attract potential members and encourage participation. 
 Increased investment in religious capital may be reflected in a congregation’s 
expectations of individuals’ behavior in their home and personal practices (i.e. practices 
outside of church services).  Table 3 provides data on four items on personal prayer and   
other spiritual practices, family devotions, fasting, and abstaining from pre-marital sex.  
The scores range from 1, associated with “Not at all,” to 5, associated with “A great 
deal.”    
 
Table 3: Megachurches Compared To Non-Megachurches For Emphasis on 
Expected Practices 
 
Practice Megachurch Non-Megachurch p-value
Presonal prayer, scripture study,etc. 4.65 4.14 0.000
Family Devotions 3.96 3.44 0.000
Fasting 2.90 2.35 0.000
Abstaining from pre-marital sex 4.00 3.19 0.000  
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The results suggest that megachurches do have statistically significantly higher 
expectations of home and personal practices in each of these categories.  Accommodating 
these expectations may indicate that individuals are investing in their religious capital. 
 Finally, if we consider the outcome of increased religious investment to include 
an increased emotional engagement in their beliefs, there is another set of survey 
responses that deserves attention.  The survey inquired how well a series of questions 
described the congregation.  The questions dealt with the congregation’s spiritual vitality, 
its ability to help members deepen their relationship with God, whether the members are 
excited about the future of the congregation, whether the congregation welcomes 
innovation and change, and whether the congregation has a clear sense of mission and 
purpose.  Scores are presented in Table 4 and range from 1, for “Not at all” to 5, for 
“Very well”.   
 
Table 4: Level of Emotional Agreement For Attendees of Megachurches and Non-
Megachurches  
 
Statement About Congregation Megachurch Non-Megachurch p-value
Spiritually vital 4.37 3.86 0.000
Helps members deepen relationship with God 4.31 3.89 0.000
Reflects excitement about future 4.50 3.90 0.000
Welcomes innovation and change 4.15 3.41 0.000
Clear sense of mission and purpose 4.40 3.62 0.000  
 
Across all dimensions, the data indicate that the members of the megachurch have a 
statistically significantly higher emotional attachment to their church than members of 
non-megachurches.  Again, this may indicate a higher level of religious investment.  
 Taken together, the FACT2000 data suggest that megachurches employ groups to 
a greater degree than non-megachurches and that, in turn, encourages additional 
investment in religious capital.    This manifests itself in increased expectations of 
personal practices and emotional investment in the megachurch compared to the non-
megachurch.  The outcome may best be summarized by one last survey question.  It asks 
whether new people are easily assimilated into the congregation.  Using the same scale as 
for Table 4, megachurches score 3.94 while non-megachurches score 3.76 (a difference 
that is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.004). 
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V. Conclusion 
Megachurches have generated attention both in the popular media and among 
academics from various disciplines.  Studies suggest that these churches are significantly 
different from more established, traditional, denominational churches.  Their success 
seems to contradict a significant amount of prior literature that emphasizes strictness as a 
strategy for success, suggesting that megachurches employ a novel approach for church 
growth.  This paper provides an economic model of utility maximization, allowing for 
both private and spillover benefits from participating in religious activities, to explain the 
success of megachurches to attract and retain members.  The model focuses on 
megachurches’ ability to subsidize individuals’ investment in religious capital by 
providing a variety of groups to the individual thereby increasing participation.  In turn, 
megachurches may expect individual attachment to the organization to rise and then place 
greater expectations on the individual’s participation.   
Data from the FACT2000 survey support these hypotheses.  Responses from the 
survey indicate that megachurches employ groups more than non-megachurches, that 
megachurches achieve higher participation than non-megachurches, and that the 
emotional commitment among megachurch members exceeds that of non-megachurch 
members.  This leads us to repudiate the claim that megachurches represent a “low-
commitment” form of religion.  Instead, we conclude that megachurches employ a 
strategy of offering participation in groups that combine secular and non-secular 
activities.  This strategy transforms secular activities and religious participation into 
complementary goods as opposed to substitutes.  This, in turn, increases the individual’s 
optimal level of investment in religion and therefore the desired level of participation.  As 
a result, individuals display a higher level of satisfaction and stronger emotional 
commitment to the church, thereby allowing for the church to raise expectations of 
individual faith practices.  
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